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The literature suggests that individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD)
are deficient in their Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities. They sometimes do not
seem to appreciate that behaviour is motivated by underlying mental states. If
this is true, then individuals with ASD should also be deficient when they use
their ToM to represent and take part in dyadic interactions. In the current study
we compared the performance of normally intelligent adolescents and adults with
ASD to typically developing controls. In one task they heard a narrative about
an interaction and then retold it. In a second task they played a communication
game that required them to take into account another person’s perspective. We
found that when they described people’s behaviour the ASD individuals used
fewer mental terms in their story narration, suggesting a lower tendency to
represent interactions in mentalistic terms. Surprisingly, ASD individuals and
control participants showed the same level of performance in the communication
game that required them to distinguish between their beliefs and the other’s
beliefs. Given that ASD individuals show no deficiency in using their ToM in real
interaction, it is unlikely that they have a systematically deficient ToM.
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Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are defined by behavioural and
developmental impairments in social and communicative domains and by
repetitive behaviour (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Among the
most striking features ascribed to individuals with ASD are claimed to be
their poor ‘‘Theory of Mind’’ abilities (Volkmar, Lord, Bailey, Schultz, &
Klin, 2004). Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the ability to ascribe mental
states to others or oneself and to explain and predict behaviour in terms of
underlying mental states (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000).
Even though the latter part of this definition entails verbal and conceptual
abilities, the term ‘‘Theory of Mind’’ originates from a study of chimpanzee
behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and in principle allows for tacit
interpretation skills that do not require sophisticated concepts or verbal
abilities. However, most studies on ToM have operationalized this construct
by evaluating conceptual knowledge of mental constructs in young, typically
developing children (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) or in children with
autism spectrum disorders (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Yirmiya,
Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998).
Yet the main function of a ToM is to master social situations. It is thus
surprising that the way people apply their ToM skills to social interactions
has been largely ignored in developmental psychology (Frith, Happe´, &
Siddons, 1994; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003; Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar,
2003). Social psychology has contributed significantly to this research under
slightly different headings—empathy, perspective taking, and attribution of
mental states (e.g., Ames, 2004; Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich,
2004; Malle & Hodges, 2005; Malle, Knobe, O’Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson,
2000). The goal of the current study was to investigate the use of perspective
taking and mental-state inference in representing and taking part in dyadic
interactions and to compare the performance of adolescents and adults with
ASD to the performance of typically developing controls.
Research on the development of ToM has focused on young children and
has assumed a quite idealized, and in some respect erroneous, ToM ability in
adults. Recent findings in social psychology reveal a more complex picture
of adults. One line of research has demonstrated that adults have a
sophisticated concept of intentional action. They attend in detail to the
mental states involved in it, and they use these concepts widely when they
describe and explain behaviour. Yet, even though people attempt to infer the
thoughts and feelings of another person, their accuracy is far from perfect
(e.g., Ickes, 1993; Klein & Hedges, 2001). In particular, people often have
difficulties appreciating that others may be ignorant about some fact or have
a false belief about it (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino, & Samson,
2006). Consequently, at times they behave egocentrically, assuming that the
other individual has access to their private knowledge (Keysar et al., 2003;
Nickerson, 1999).
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Limitations of the adult ToM can be identified if an adult-appropriate
task is used that leaves room for error. In the widely used standard false-
belief task, which is assumed to demonstrate a fully-fledged ToM from six
years of age onward (Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), the
subject knows the actual hiding location of an object and also knows that
another person falsely believes it is hidden in a different place. When asked
to predict where that person will look for the object, young children tend to
confound their knowledge with the knowledge of the other person and
predict that the other will look where the object really is, not where that
person (falsely) believes it is. This failure to attribute false beliefs disappears
after age four. Yet, by slightly modifying this task, Birch and Bloom (2007)
showed a lingering confounding of self- and other-knowledge even with
adults. Instead of asking for a categorical prediction about where the person
will look for the object, the researchers asked for a probability estimate.
Indeed, adults estimate the probability that the other will look at the true
location to be higher when they themselves know the location than when
they don’t, again confounding somewhat their own knowledge with the
knowledge ascribed to the other. In evaluating ToM in individuals with
autism, then, it is crucial to measure ToM performance in tasks that are
sensitive both to the ability and its limitation. We will describe two such
tasks that are new to the literature on autism and ToM and examine the
relative performance of individuals with ASD and neurotypical controls.
Do individuals with ASD show limited ToM abilities? The literature does
not provide a clear-cut answer to this question (e.g., Gernsbacher &
Frymiare, 2005). The results vary with age, IQ, and the nature of the task
(Begeer, Koot, Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Stegge, 2008; Rajendran &
Mitchell, 2007). One of the most common ways to evaluate ToM skills has
been to use conceptual tasks such as the false-belief task. This approach has
provided evidence for impaired ToM abilities in school-aged children with
ASD (Yirmiya et al., 1998). However, adolescents and adults with ASD, in
particular those with normal IQ (high-functioning ASD) often pass
conceptual ToM tasks at various levels of complexity (Bowler, 1992;
Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996). Moreover, their performance on such
tasks does not predict social behaviour in everyday settings (Fombonne,
Siddons, Achard, & Frith, 1994; Frith et al., 1994; Peterson, Slaughter, &
Paynter, 2007; Travis, Sigman, & Ruskin, 2001).
Though adolescents with high-functioning ASD often perform ade-
quately on standard conceptual ToM tasks, they seem to perform worse on
more advanced measures of ToM. These can include advanced ‘‘static’’ tests
such as paper-and-pencil tasks that focus on the conceptual understanding
of relatively complex interactions, requiring inferences of second-order
mental states and the understanding of irony or emotional display
rules. These tests have uncovered robust differences between children with
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high-functioning ASD and controls (Happe´, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen,
1999; Kaland et al., 2002). However, adults with high-functioning ASD
show no impairments on these tasks, and, just like controls, are able to
acknowledge both the existence and the importance of mental states
(Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001). Such adequate performance of
high-functioning ASD adults is often attributed to cognitive compensation,
the ability to use general cognitive and language skills to circumvent the
conceptual ToM problem and still find a solution to the task (Bowler, 1992;
Frith et al., 1994; Tager-Flusberg, 1993).
More dynamic, behavioural tests did indicate ToM limitations in high-
functioning adults with ASD, even in those who pass static tests (Dziobek
et al., 2006; Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Golan, 2006; Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999; Kleinman, Marciano, & Ault, 2001). For example, movie clips
of acted or naturally occurring social interactions consistently elicit less-
adequate explanations and less empathic accuracy in adults with high-
functioning ASD than in controls (Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, &
Rutter, 2000; Ickes, 1993; Roeyers et al., 2001).
Though there is evidence for ToM impairments in ASD individuals, none
of the evidence emerged from situations in which these individuals were
engaged in actual interaction. Conversely, some evidence suggests that even
children with high-functioning ASD might perform unimpaired in some
settings of actual interactions. In a study by Begeer, Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt,
and Stockmann (2003) children with high-functioning ASD showed clear
impairments in correcting another person’s false beliefs during natural
interactions, but their performance improved when they were motivated to
respond adequately. Moreover, a study by Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, and de
Corte (2005) suggests that adults with high-functioning ASD can sponta-
neously ascribe thoughts and feelings to a person with whom they just
interacted at similar rates as controls. Thus, more research is clearly needed to
examine the scope and limits of adequate ToM performance of high-
functioning ASD individuals in contexts of social interaction.
In the current study we compared high-functioning ASD adolescents and
adults with typically developing controls on two new tasks. The narrative
task requires participants to read a story describing an ambiguous social
interaction and to later retell the story. The interaction task requires
participants to engage with another person in a highly structured
communication game. Thus, both tasks require the handling of a social
interaction, but a represented one in the narrative task and an experienced
one in the interaction task. Both require linguistic processes, but of
production in the narrative task and of comprehension in the interaction
task. Most important, both require mental state inferences, but one in
service of meaningful representation and the other in service of successful
mastery of an interaction goal.
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STUDY 1: NARRATIVE TASK
Typically developing adults routinely use mental-state terms in their
narrative representation of social interactions (Barker & Givo´n, 2005),
but there are no data on adults with high-functioning ASD on this
ability. There is some indication that they use fewer mental-state
formulations than control participants when interpreting ambiguous
geometric shapes that enact a social plot in a cartoon animation (Klin,
2000; Klin et al., 2003). In the current study, a simpler method was
employed, taking advantage of the ubiquitous situation of hearing or
reading about an interaction and having to describe it to another person.
All participants read a short story about an ambiguous interaction
between two people (Malle & Holland Rogers, 2008). The story described
the story characters’ behaviours but made no explicit reference to their
mental states, such as beliefs, desires, or emotions. After some delay,
participants were asked to retell the story. If people spontaneously make
sense of ambiguous social interactions by inferring underlying mental
states, these inferences should emerge in the retelling as mental state
words such as ‘‘wanted’’, ‘‘thought’’, ‘‘was confused’’ and ‘‘trusted’’, even
though none of those words were part of the original story. Consistent
with Klin et al.’s results, we expected that the ASD group would include
fewer references to mental states in their retelling narratives than control
participants.
Method
Participants. Participants were 68 adolescents and adults (53 males, 15
females), including 34 participants with an autism spectrum disorder and 34
typically developing control participants, who were matched on chronolo-
gical age and cognitive abilities. The ASD participants were recruited from
two psychiatric institutions in the Netherlands. Their diagnostic classifica-
tion was based on assessments by a psychiatrist and multiple informants
(psychologists and educationalists). All participants fulfilled established
diagnostic criteria according to the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). For part of the ASD sample, additional diagnostic
information was obtained from the Children’s Social Behaviour Ques-
tionnaire (CSBQ; Luteijn, Minderaa, & Jackson, 2002) and from the self-
reported and parental-reported Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen,
Hoekstra, Knickmeyer, & Wheelwright, 2006; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). These measures confirmed the clinical
diagnoses (see Table 1).
The control group was recruited from schools, colleges and universities
around Amsterdam, the Netherlands. IQ scores for all participants were
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obtained by a short version of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-
III (Wechsler et al., 1991) or the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(Wechsler, 1997). Four subtests (Vocabulary, Arithmetic, Block Design,
and Picture Arrangement) were administered to assess intelligence. These
subtests are known to correlate highly with Full-scale IQ in the general
populations (Donders, 2001).
Material. In this task, participants read a short story about an
interaction between a man and a woman in a domestic context (Malle &
Holland Rogers, 2008; see appendix). The story included no terms that
explicitly referred to mental states such as beliefs, desires, emotions or
intentions. However, the text provided clues about the story character’s
mental states—for example, by referring to their physical state (a trembling
hand) or their behaviour (suddenly leaving the room). After an average of 20
minutes (during which the interaction task, described in Study 2, was
administered), participants were asked ‘‘Could you retell the story?’’ and
‘‘Could you tell me what the story was about?’’
Procedure. The participant first read the narrative task story on a
computer screen and then completed the interaction task. The confederate
was then asked to wait in another room while the participant answered the
two questions about the story they had read, and finally they completed the
IQ test and were debriefed.
Dependent variables. Participant’s retelling of the story was transcribed
and scored for the use of mental-state terms. Mental-state terms included all
references to beliefs, ideas, or thoughts (e.g., ‘‘he thinks’’, ‘‘she knows’’),
TABLE 1
Details of the two participant groups
ASD (n¼ 34) Control (n¼ 34) Group comparison
Age (years;months) 16;7 (4;2) 16;8 (3;8) p¼ .94
Gender (Male/Female) 26/8 27/7 p¼ .77
FSIQa 108.5 (21.1) 105.8 (18.3) p¼ .62
CSBQ (parent)a 41.8 (17.6) 6.4 (8.5) p 5.000
(n¼ 16) (n¼ 19)
AQ (parent)a 35.3 (3.0) 21.9 (3.8) p 5.000
(n¼ 6) (n¼ 6)
AQ (self-report)a 33.0 (3.9) 23.5 (2.6) p 5.000
(n¼ 9) (n¼ 9)
Notes: ASD¼Autism Spectrum Disorder, FSIQ¼ full-scale IQ; CSBQ¼Children’s Social
Behaviour Questionnaire; AQ¼Autism Quotient Questionnaire. aMeans (SD).
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references to desires, hoping, longing or preferences (e.g., ‘‘she needed’’,
‘‘he didn’t want’’) as well as references to emotional states (e.g., ‘‘he was
angry’’, ‘‘he was feeling sad’’). These results held up in separate analyses
of specific mental-state categories, beliefs, desires and emotions (ds
ranging from 0.40 to 0.68). Overall agreement between two independent
raters of mental-state references was .78. Disagreements were resolved
through discussion.
Results
Differences between the number of mental-state references in the narrative
of individuals with ASD or typical development were analysed with an
ANCOVA, controlling for participants’ age and full-scale IQ. The ASD
group reported fewer mental-state references (M¼ 1.06, SD¼ 1.32) than the
control group (M¼ 2.38, SD¼ 1.99); F(1, 64)¼ 13.60, p5 .001, d¼ 0.89.
When the number of mental-state references was divided by the overall
number of words used in each recounted story, the ASD participants still
reported a lower proportion of mental-state references (M¼ 0.02,
SD¼ 0.02) than controls (M¼ 0.04, SD¼ 0.04); F(1, 64)¼ 4.36, p5 .05,
d¼ 0.51.
STUDY 2: INTERACTION TASK
This task was designed to engage participants in an interaction that could be
successfully mastered when taking into account the perceptions and beliefs
of their interaction partner. Each participant played a communication game
in which another person (the ‘‘director’’) instructed the participant (‘‘the
addressee’’) to move objects in a grid (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004;
Keysar et al., 2003; Wu & Keysar, 2007). The two individuals shared
knowledge about the location of mutually visible objects, while other objects
were visible only to the addressee but not the director. For example,
as shown in Figure 1, when the director says to move ‘‘the big spoon’’
the intended target must be the mutually visible spoon. However, if the
addressee fails to take the director’s perspective, he or she may consider the
occluded spoon as the referent. This confusion may delay the identification
of the actual target spoon and possibly even cause the addressee to
mistakenly move the occluded spoon that the director could not have
referred to, which would be an egocentric error. This task requires the
spontaneous and repeated use of ToM to interpret the other person’s
behaviour in an unfolding social interaction. If ASD individuals are
deficient in their use of ToM, then they should make more egocentric errors
and show a longer latency to move the target objects than control
participants.
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Method
Participants. The participants were the same as in Study 1.
Material. Participants were seated on opposite sides of a grid that
consisted of 16 (464) open slots. One person was always a female
confederate who served the role of director, instructing participants to move
objects around in the grid. Five of the slots were occluded from the
director’s view but were clearly visible to the participant (see Figure 1). One
mutually visible slot was empty. All other slots were filled with different
objects. The task consisted of five blocks in which the participant moved a
total of 64 target objects, four blocks with 12 objects and one block with 16
objects. Out of these 64 objects, 18 were designated ‘‘critical’’: They involved
a competitor object that was, from the participant’s perspective, a potential
referent of the director’s instruction (e.g., ‘‘Take the big spoon’’), but
because the object was occluded from the director’s view, it could not have
been the intended referent. These trials thus contained ambiguous
directions, which were contrasted with neutral (non-ambiguous) trials to
form a within-subject factor of target type.
The target object and competitor object were always arranged in
diagonally opposite quarters of the grid, making the object of attention
and reaching easy to discern on video. The instructions in critical trials
contained either size ambiguity (e.g., ‘‘Move the big spoon’’) or semantic
ambiguity (e.g., the instruction ‘‘Move the tape’’ when a cassette tape was
Figure 1. Array of objects presented from the addressee’s and the director’s perspective. One of
the critical instructions for the director in this trial was to ‘‘move the big spoon to the empty
slot’’. Moving the mutually visible spoon in the top corner slot would suggest adequate
perspective taking. In contrast, moving the occluded spoon would suggest an egocentric
interpretation. To view this figure in colour, please visit the online version of this Journal.
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mutually visible but a roll of Sellotape was visible only to the addressee).
The position of the critical trials varied in a predetermined random fashion.
Participants were filmed with a digital video camera positioned in the
centre of the second row from the top, focused on their face. The camera
was approximately 50 cm from their head. A second camera located behind
the participants recorded their reaching.
Procedure. The participant and the confederate learned that they would
be playing a communication game, which involved one of them telling the
other which objects to move around in the grid. To make sure the addressee
understood the director’s perspective, both participants practiced the roles
of director and addressee. The role of the director was then (purportedly
randomly) assigned to the confederate, and the role of addressee was
assigned to the participant. The director received a drawing that showed the
grid from her perspective and specified the order in which the objects should
be moved. After each block of moving objects the experimenter returned the
objects to their original position in the grid. In the meantime, to make sure
that participants believed that the director could not see the objects in the
occluded slots, the director was asked to turn around while the grid was
being filled with objects.
Dependent variables. Two raters who were unaware of the hypothesis
and of participants’ diagnosis coded the videotapes for egocentric errors and
the latency to move the target object. Egocentric errors were scored when
the participant moved the occluded object (e.g., the hidden spoon) and
placed it in the empty slot. Inter-rater reliability was 1.00. The latency to
move the target object was defined as the temporal window from the
director’s mention of the object to be moved (e.g., ‘‘Move the big spoon’’) to
the addressee’s putting down the object in another slot.
Results
To examine egocentric errors, we conducted a 2 (Target Type: ambiguous
vs. neutral)62 (Group: ASD vs. typically developing controls) ANCOVA,
controlling for participants’ age and full-scale IQ. In general, participants
made more egocentric errors in ambiguous trials (M¼ 39%) than in neutral
trials (M¼ 0%); F(1, 64)¼ 33.16, p5 .001, d¼ 1.76. ASD individuals
showed a nominally smaller error rate (M¼ 34%) than the control group
(M¼ 43%), but this difference was not significant; F(1, 64)¼ 2.52, ns. The
same pattern emerged for the percentage of people in each group who were
able to avoid all egocentric errors: ASD (M¼ 21%) vs. control group
(M¼ 9%); F(1, 64)¼ 1.65, ns. So the tendency to avoid making egocentric
errors clearly showed no advantage for control over ASD individuals.
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The number of egocentric errors of the ASD group in the ambiguous
condition was substantially correlated with chronological age, r(34)¼7.47,
p5 .01, and full-scale IQ, r(34)¼7.51, p5 .01. The corresponding
correlations in the control group were small and non-significant, chron-
ological age: r(34)¼7.12, ns; full-scale IQ: r(34)¼7.20, ns. However, the
difference between the correlations in the ASD and control groups did not
reach traditional significance levels (for age with egocentric errors: z¼ 1.53,
p¼ .14, for IQ and egocentric errors: z¼ 1.41, p¼ .17, respectively).
Participants’ latencies of moving objects were longer in ambiguous trials
(M¼ 3.20 s, SD¼ 0.91) than in neutral trials (M¼ 2.69 s, SD¼ 0.65),
indicating that the presence of a competitor delayed the selection of the
target. Importantly, this delay was not significantly larger for the ASD
group (M¼ 0.60 s, SD¼ 0.58) than for the control group (M¼ 0.42 s,
SD¼ 0.51). Thus, a 2 (Group: ASD vs. control)62 (Trial Type: ambiguous
vs. neutral) repeated-measures ANCOVA (controlling for participants’ age
and full-scale IQ) showed a significant main effect of Trial Type; F(1,
64)¼ 5.67, p5 .05, d¼ 0.58, but no effect of Group (F5 1) or interaction;
F(1, 64)¼ 1.87, ns.
The latencies in the ambiguous condition of both the ASD and control
groups were significantly correlated with chronological age, r(34)¼7.55,
p5 .01 and r(34)¼7.59, p5 .01, respectively, and full-scale IQ,
r(34)¼7.35, p5 .05 and r(34)¼7.20, p5 .05, respectively, suggesting
that all participants were able to respond more quickly with increasing
chronological and mental age.
In sum, all participants, whether ASD or control group members,
produced some errors of perspective taking, but ASD individuals produced
no more than did control participants. Response latencies, too, showed no
group differences (see Table 2).
Correspondence between narrative and interaction tasks. Separate ana-
lyses of the HFASD and control groups indicated no correlations between
mental-state references in the narrative task and either egocentric errors
TABLE 2
Mean (SD) proportion of reaching errors and reaction times following neutral or
ambiguous instructions on the perspective taking task
Reaching errors Reaction time (s)
Ambiguous Neutral Ambiguous Neutral
ASD (n¼ 34) 0.34 (0.23) 0 3.29 (0.99) 2.68 (0.70)
Control (n¼ 34) 0.43 (0.21) 0 3.12 (0.82) 2.70 (0.60)
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(HFASD: r¼ .05; control: r¼ .22) or delays (HFASD: r¼ .12; control:
r¼ .10) in the interaction task.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study compared adolescents and adults with ASD and typically
developing control participants on two tasks. One task required participants
to represent and narrate a social interaction scene, the other required them
to take the perspective of the other in a structured social interaction. The
narration task showed the documented difference in the use of mental-state
terms, such that ASD individuals used fewer terms of belief, desire, and
emotion when retelling a short story than did control participants. By
contrast, ASD individuals and controls were identical in their ability to take
another person’s knowledge into account when interpreting what she/he
said. This demonstrates that ASD individuals can be just as effective as
controls in using their ToM when it really matters: When they try to
understand others’ behaviour. These results, therefore, argue against the
suggestion that ASD individuals have a deficient ToM.
The most sceptical interpretation of our findings would point out that
they are null results that contrast with the vast literature that suggests ToM
impairments in autism (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Yirmiya et al., 1998). But
Rajendran and Mitchell (2007) argued against a dismissal of tests that don’t
show differences between ASD and neurotypical individuals. Such a
dismissal stems from ‘‘the assumption that individuals with autism do have
an impaired ToM, implying that tests which do not reveal impairments must
be insensitive or unsuitable’’ (p. 229). However, performance on the
interaction task is sensitive to a variety of factors. It varies with mood as
people perform more egocentrically when they are happy than when they are
sad (Converse, Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2008); it varies with culture as
Westerners show more egocentrism than East Asians (Wu & Keysar, 2007)
and it varies with levels of friendship, as friends show more egocentrism than
strangers (Savitsky, Keysar, Epley, Carter, & Swanson, 2009). So the task
captures something psychologically real and systematic, and it demands the
very perspective taking processes that are assumed to be lacking in autistic
individuals.
Most importantly, one of the most trusted methods used to argue that
ASD individuals lack ToM is the false-belief task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, &
Frith, 1985). The present interaction task and the false-belief task employ
the same underlying logic. They both dissociate the knowledge of self and
that of the other and assess the ability of the self to take the perspective of
the other. Therefore, if the false-belief task is supposed to reflect ToM
ability, then the interaction task must reflect it as well. Furthermore, our
task requires participants to use their ToM to interpret actions in real time,
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thus requiring spontaneous, non-reflective use of this ability. The interaction
task is thus directly related to one of the main functions of ToM to begin
with—to interpret the behaviour of others. Therefore, the fact that the task
does not display differences between ASD and control individuals must be
explained rather than dismissed.
One explanation of the lack of differences in the interaction task is that
when individuals with ASD need to process the other person’s beliefs and
knowledge in a real social interaction, they can do so just as well as typically
developing individuals. Therefore, they appear to have an intact ToM when
it counts—when they have to interpret the behaviour of real others in a real
setting. This may be too strong a conclusion, however, because the
interaction task represents only one particular kind of interaction—a
structured referential communication—and does not always generalize to
other social interactions. Even so, our results are consistent with other
findings that have shown that structured social interactions elicit adequate
use of ToM skills, as evidenced by similar responses to others’ mental or
emotional states and similar empathic accuracy in children and adults with
ASD and matched controls (Begeer, Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, Stegge, &
Koot, 2007; Begeer et al., 2003; Begeer, Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, &
Stockmann, 2006; Ponnet et al., 2005).
What is it about structured interactions that allows successful social
behaviour in ASD individuals? Structured interactions remove two
challenges that normally hamper ASD individuals’ social behaviour in
unstructured, freely unfolding social interactions. First, ASD individuals are
easily over aroused, which often results in attempts to regulate their arousal
with stereotypic and withdrawal behaviour (Belmonte & Yurgelun-Todd,
2003; Liss, Saulnier, Kinsbourne, & Kinsbourne, 2006; Raymaekers, van der
Meere, & Roeyers, 2004). Such behaviours make interactions awkward and
difficult to conduct. Second, children with ASD often process information in
a piecemeal rather than holistic way, thus failing to integrate information on
a global, abstract level. Information that emerges during unstructured social
interactions often requires such global processing to understand the
meaning of the interaction (Frith, 2003; Happe´, 1993). Both over arousal
and piecemeal processing may be neutralized in structured social interaction.
Such interactions are rule driven and therefore predefine the meaning of
most steps in the interaction, so global processing is no longer essential for
appropriate responses (see also Gallagher, 2004).
The availability of a well-defined structure also opens the possibility that
ASD individuals may not have solved the critical trials in the interaction
task by using a ToM. Rather, they might have adopted the general rule
never to pay attention to the ‘‘objects with a black background’’ because the
director could not refer to them. Whether such a rule requires a prior mental
state ascription that the director doesn’t see them or doesn’t know about
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them, is an interesting further question. One finding in our study is
consistent with the idea that ASD individuals might have solved the task by
way of such a ‘‘smart rule’’. In the ASD group, we found a correlation
between reaching errors, age, and IQ. The older and more intelligent the
ASD participants were, the more effective they were in the interaction task.
Thus, they might have relied more on their experience and general cognitive
abilities than on actual inferences about mental states. Similar correlations,
in particular between IQ and social competence, have been shown in earlier
studies on ASD (Bolte & Poustka, 2003; Buitelaar, van der, Swaab-
Barneveld, & van der Gaag, 1999; Kamio, Wolf, & Fein, 2006; Klin et al.,
2007; Steele, Joseph, & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Yirmiya, Sigman, Kasari, &
Mundy, 1992). The absence of such correlations among typically developing
individuals are often explained by assuming that these individuals rely on a
more intuitive, automatic perspective-taking ability that requires less
conscious cognitive reflection (Klin et al., 2003). However, the interaction
task does not by itself reveal what cognitive processes individuals used to
solve the task. Furthermore, using a smart rule is still likely triggered by
considering what the other person knows. Moreover, it may often be
adaptive to use rules in social interactions and we should be careful not to
argue that typically developing individuals wholly refrain from using rules in
their ToM behaviour. These issues are important considerations in future
research.
In contrast to the structured interaction task, the situation described in
the narrative task was unstructured and ambiguous. To the extent that the
meaning of this interaction was difficult to comprehend for individuals
with ASD, they may have tried to restate verbatim what was said in the
story, resulting in fewer mental-state references. However, gist recall
beyond the given text does not necessarily include mental-state references,
so a difference in memory functions can not fully explain the current
findings. Still, it could be that in response to unstructured social
interactions, individuals with autism do not recruit mental-state inferences
but that in response to structured interactions they do recruit mental-state
inferences.
Second, the ability to take another’s perspective during actual interac-
tions may be triggered in a different way than the ability to attribute
mental states to story characters that one is not engaging with (Slaughter,
Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007; Taumoepeau & Ruffman, 2008). The
absence of a direct engagement may hamper the motivation to ascribe
mental states to story characters in ASD individuals, who strongly depend
on explicit cues (Begeer et al., 2007). The frequency of mental-state
referencing in children with ASD was recently even found to be independent
from the actual tendency to engage in conversations about mental states in
real-life interactions (Muller & Schuler, 2006). Furthermore, a perspective-
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taking error in social interaction could elicit direct feedback from interaction
partners. This may provide a beneficial context for individuals with ASD
who have shown improved performances under explicit and goal-directed
conditions (Begeer et al., 2006, 2007; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007).
Two further limitations of our study must be acknowledged. First, the
limited availability of information from standardized diagnostic measures
could reduce the validity of participants’ diagnoses. However, when the
analyses were run for only those participants for whom this information was
available all the effects of interest remained, even though the number of
participants was reduced to 22 ASD and 22 control individuals. Second, age
and IQ were correlated in both ASD and control individuals in our sample.
While this has no impact on our main question, it did not allow us to
disentangle the separate contributions of IQ and experience on ToM
performance.
The vast majority of the substantial body of ToM publications (750
papers in the period 1985–2000 alone) used variants of false-belief tasks
(Hughes et al., 2000). It is high time that research turned to an analysis of
the multiple components and dimensions that constitute ToM skills (Malle,
2008). Our studies take a small step in this direction by examining
dimensions such as represented versus experienced social interaction;
structured versus ambiguous social tasks; and linguistic production versus
comprehension. We found that comprehension in experienced structured
interactions may not pose a problem for ASD individuals’ ToM
performance. Systematic variation of these and other components in future
research may reveal the specific kind of ToM deficits that ASD individuals
display. A careful examination of age groups between childhood and
adulthood is another imperative for future research. To that end, more
information is needed on neurotypical adult ToM skills along multiple
dimensions and across multiple tasks to provide the baseline for studying
these dimensions in adults with ASD. Knowledge at this level of specific
components may then suggest specific training approaches to alleviate
particular difficulties that ASD individuals encounter.
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APPENDIX
The mental state story
Justine came into the dining room, cupping her hand beneath a spoon that
dripped yellow sauce. ‘‘Aren’t those flowers great? Four dollars for the
bouquet, how about that? Did you wind the clock?’’
Howard did not look up from the newspaper. ‘‘Later,’’ he said.
‘‘Please?’’
He looked up. ‘‘Watch the spoon. You’re going to stain the carpet.’’
‘‘It chimed seven. This clock is really slow.’’
‘‘You just dribbled.’’
She looked down. ‘‘I caught it.’’ She showed him her cupped hand. ‘‘See?
Dinner is going to be great. Now would you wind the clock?’’
He took in a deep breath, then exhaled loudly. ‘‘All right.’’ He closed the
paper. The headline read, ‘‘DEATH TOLL RISES’’.
After she had gone back into the kitchen, he read the lead story again.
Then he stood and went to the mantle where the clock sat among
ballerina figurines. He opened the clock’s crystal. As he fitted the key into
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the clock, his hand trembled. He hesitated. He took another deep breath, let
it out slowly, and dropped the key into his pocket without winding the
clock.
Howard looked toward the kitchen, bit his lip, then took the clock down
from the mantle. Inside the door was taped a business card from the jeweller
who had replaced a broken spring. Howard pulled the card free, then
jammed it against the flywheel. The clock stopped ticking. Then he wound it.
He returned to the table just as Justine carried in their salad bowls. ‘‘Did
you wind it?’’ she asked.
‘‘Didn’t I say I would?’’
She put the bowls down and turned back toward the kitchen. ‘‘I’m
fussing, I know. The house just isn’t right without that clock chiming the
quarter hours.’’
Howard folded his newspaper, and after she had again left the room he
said, ‘‘I agree.’’
She came back in with their dinner plates. ‘‘How was your day? Mine was
marvellous. Business was slow all over the store, but I had three big ring-
ups. Bianca said it’s all about attitude.’’
He cut his meat.
‘‘So how was your day?’’
‘‘My day.’’ He shook his head.
‘‘Not so good? Tomorrow will be better.’’
‘‘I’m not counting on it.’’
‘‘Well your job has always given you a great deal of . . .’’
‘‘It’s not my job,’’ he said. He nodded at the paper.
She followed his gaze towards the headline. ‘‘You can’t let that get you
down.’’
‘‘Can’t I?’’
She twisted her napkin in her hands. ‘‘It doesn’t have to touch us.’’
‘‘It’s better if it does touch us. It’s touching everyone.’’
If the clock had been running, it would have struck the quarter-hour by
now.
He said, ‘‘There are times when it is obscene to be cheery. Obscene!’’
Justine’s face was white. She threw her wadded napkin onto the plate. She
knocked her chair over in her hurry to stand and leave.
Howard’s hands trembled again as he speared a bite.
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